Contractor Self-Oversight (CSO)



Briefing for the Joint CAS Executive Meeting July 30, 1997

Background


- ◆ CAS Reform PAT Report (5-4)
 - Recommended CSO test in Quality Assurance
- ◆ USD (A&T) memorandum, 21 Aug 95
 - ◆ Do it
 - ◆ DCMC: Other applications too...
 - Property
 - Production
 - ◆ Also another alternative to DCMC QA--Lab Testing

What it Means

Different way of engaging---not disengagement!

- QA & Property
 - ◆ Designated contractor rep performs surveillance otherwise performed by DCMC
- Lab Testing
 - ◆ Lab testing vs. DCMC to determine acceptabilty
- Production
 - ◆ Disengage if contractor accurately forecasts late deliveries

CSO in QA Experiments



Scope - QA

- 16 sites
- Experiment scopes varied
 - From specific process to entire plant
- Contract items varied
 - From C&T to helicopters and missiles
- About 35 DCMC manyears impacted

Metrics - QA

	CY 1996		
	<u>2Q</u>	<u>3Q</u>	<u>4Q</u>
DCMC Savings	215K	223K	198K
New Contractor Costs	<u>27K</u>	<u>157K</u>	<u>130K</u>
Net DoD Savings	188K	66K	68K
Surv Escapes (old)	28	16	7
Surv Escapes (new)	<u>25</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>
Net Change	-3	-6	-5

Comment Analysis - QA

	<u>Neg</u>	<u>?</u>	Pos
Customers	0	7	9
CAOs	3	0	13
Contractors	<u>1</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>15</u>
Composite:	8%	15%	77%

Conclusions - QA

- CSO is viable when:
 - Government needs to engage
 - DCMC and customers agree that contractor can act for us.
- CSO is not
 - a universal solution
 - disengagement
- Other tools exist to reduce involvement
 - PROCAS/risk assessment
 - CoC

CSO in Production Experiments

What It Means - Production

- Contractor forecasts contract delinquencies
- DCMC validates delivery forecast data
- DCMC continues surveillance until goal met
- Goal: 90% accuracy for 3 months
- When goal met, DCMC stops routine on-site surveillance

Scope - Production

- 32 Sites
- Large, medium, small firms included
- Items varied from electronics to cranes
- One process to entire plant
- Number of customers varied from one to ten buying activities

Metrics - Production

- 7 of 32 sites reached goal
- Delinquency rate down at successful sites: 3 to 1%
- Avg delinquency rate for sites short of goal: 35%
- Notification rate for successful sites: 100%
- Notification rate for non-successful sites: 25%
- Avg prior notification, successful sites: 20 days
- Avg prior notification, non-successful sites: 7 days

Comment Analysis - Production

	Neg	?	Pos
Customers	2	27	3
CAOs	12	1	19
Contractors	<u>13</u>	1	<u>18</u>
Composite:	28%	30%	42%

Conclusions - Production

- CSO can work when:
 - Contractor has low delinquency rate
 - Customers agree
- Limited application
- Limited savings

CSO in Property Experiments

What It Means - Property

 Contractors are required to maintain an adequate property system to control, protect, and maintain all Government property as required by the Government property clauses.

 Under experiment, designated contractor reps surveilled the contractor's Property Control System, instead of DCMC Property Administrators.

Scope - Property

 9 experiment sites finally established to evaluate concept Many Contractors
Already Operating
Under Other
Alternate Oversight
Strategies

 Experiment evaluated in terms of performance, risk, and cost

Metrics - Property Costs

Cor	eventional	CSO	Change
Gov't	191K	87K	-104K
Contractor	<u>197K</u>	<u>360K</u>	<u>+163K</u>
TOTAL	388K	447K	+59K

Metrics - Property Performance

- Designated contractor reps evaluated to same standards as DCMC Property Administrator
- 19 performance areas reviewed
- 3 contractors did not do everything they should have (but see next page)

Metrics - Property Risks

• Used criteria from DCMC Performance Based Assessment Model (inherent, past, & future risk)

Contractor	Before	<u>After</u>
1	Medium	Medium
2	Low	Low
3	Medium	Medium
4	High	Medium
5	Low	Low
6	Medium	Medium
7	Low	Medium
8	Low	Low
9	Low	Low

Comment Analysis - Property

	Neg	?	Pos
Customers	0	8	1
CAOs	1	4	4
Contractors	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>
Composite:	11%	48%	41%

Conclusions - Property

• CSO unlikely to result in huge customer cost savings or significant personnel savings to DCMC

CSO viable as an alternate strategy

CSO Lab Testing Experiments

What It Means - Lab Testing

- Voluntary one year experiment
- Spare and repair parts
- Alternative to DCMC source inspection
- Use independent labs to perform inspection
- Base acceptance on lab test results

Scope - Lab Testing

• Two locations:

Hazeltine Corp.Greenlawn, NY



2 contracts

 Chromalloy TAD Harrisburg, PA



all contracts

Metrics - Lab Testing

- Cost (Government)
 - Lab Testing Cost (\$1000/month) + WRALC Lab
 - DCMC costs avoided (\$1500/month)
- Schedule
 - Logistics response time (2 day improvement)
- Performance
 - Lab Test Results (all accepted)
 - Customer Complaints (none)

Comment Analysis - Lab Testing

	Neg	?	Pos
Customers	0	2	0
CAOs	0	1	1
Contractors	<u>O</u>	<u>1</u>	1
Composite:	0%	67%	33%

Conclusions - Lab Testing

• Lab Testing is not perceived as an effective tool by customers/contractors.

• Lab Testing adds little value when contractors have excellent performance history.

Overall Observations

- Surprising lack of contractor interest
 - ◆ QA 16; Property 9; Lab Testing - 2; Production - 32
- Feedback from participants & stakeholders
 - ◆ QA & Production Mostly Positive
 - Property Mixed
 - ◆ Lab Testing Little, but positive
- Good things
 - Apparent savings overall (caveats)
 - No apparent performance degradation (caveats)
 - CSO can work in some situations

CSO Experiment Results

- Briefed USD (A&T) May 2, 1997
- DCMC recommendations accepted
 - Conclude experiments
 - Shelve Lab Test concept (lack of interest)
 - Revise DCMC policy to make CSO in QA, Production, Property an option when customers, DCMC, and contractors agree
- Policy changes drafted, to publish Aug 97